ETHICS CODE
FAQS

The 2024 revision to the Ethics Code....

• Deletes vague references to personal interests and the "possibility" of a conflict.

• Deletes references to public trusts/authorities. Trusts are bound by state laws regarding conflicts of interests, but the beneficiary of the trusts (the City) cannot direct the conduct of trustees.

• In addition to Appointing Authority, the revision adds references to an Investigating Authority. The Investigating Authority will conduct a confidential investigation and issue findings of fact (but not recommendations) to the Appointing Authority.

• Provides that the Auditor will serve as the Investigating Authority for complaints against individual City Councilors, and the Council will remain the Appointing Authority, authorized by Council Rules to act on the Investigating Authority's findings of fact.

• Specifies what is meant by "two degrees of affinity or consanguinity" in the definition of Immediate Family.

• Makes clear that no City Official may receive, directly or indirectly, any financial or pecuniary interest, profit, or perquisites, arising from the use or loan of public funds, consistent with Article 10 Section 11 of Oklahoma's Constitution.

• Clarifies what constitutes and what does not constitute gifts, entertainment, or other favors, which may influence or be reasonably perceived as influencing a City Official in the performance of the official's duties.

• Provides that an Ethics Code complaint must be signed by the complainant, unless it meets the requirements for an anonymous complaint.

• Provides that Appointing Authorities shall create and maintain policies and supplemental guidance consistent with the ordinance.

• Eliminates the requirement that the Ethics Advisory Committee make budget recommendations and meet at least quarterly; clarifies that the EAC is not an Investigating Authority and will not issue findings or recommendations on pending complaints.

City Officials owe a duty of loyalty to the City; that is, a duty to put the publics interests before personal or private interests on matters of City business. The Ethics Code addresses scenarios in which a City Official's impartiality might be called into question or where self-dealing might be alleged. It does not address every situation in which an Official might be alleged to have violated the law, disregarded procedural rules, infringed on someone's rights, or just acted unprofessionally.

For example, the City Council's Rules and Order of Business provide that "Councilor comments must be limited to issues only. There are to be no personal attacks." If a City Councilor is alleged to have violated this rule, it would not, even if true, constitute a violation of the Ethics Code.

Therefore, a citizen complaint alleging such behavior and asserting an Ethics Code violation should be summarily dismissed pursuant to § 604.B. (Separate and distinct from the Ethics Code, the City Charter provides that "The Council may punish by fine its members or other persons for. .. for violation of Council rules." See 4 TRO § 310.)

Similarly, an allegation that a City Official violated someone's First Amendment free speech rights might subject the Official to a civil lawsuit, but it would not subject the Official to an Ethics Code complaint, because the Ethics Code does not address deprivation of constitutional rights.

Other examples of matters NOT addressed directly by the Ethics Code, but with might be addressed in other laws, policies, or rules:

• Alleged discrimination,

• Alleged dereliction of duty,

• Alleged negligence,

• Alleged violations of campaign finance requirements,

• Human Resources complaints,

• Partisan political disputes,

• Policy disagreements,

• Rudeness or unprofessional behavior,

• Tort claims.

In considering the scope of the Ethics Code, it is important to note that the Code establishes minimum standards of ethical conduct. It does not address every scenario in which an Official might be biased or pre-disposed. City Officials should consider whether their participation in an item of City business has the potential to erode public confidence in official decision-making, regardless of whether the Ethics Code strictly forbids participation.

The Ethics Code applies to City Officials, defined as "every currently serving City of Tulsa elected official, officer, employee, or member of a City of Tulsa board, commission, or committee."

The Ethics Code does not apply to trustees of independent trusts and authorities (e.g. TMUA, TAEO, TAIT), though those officials are bound by ethics laws found in state statutes and elsewhere.

The Code also does not apply to parties doing business with the City, though a City Official's interactions with such parties might raise issues under the Code for the City Official.

Similarly, a City Official might have obligations under the Code if the Official's family (spouse, children, parents, in-laws) stands to benefit from an item of City business.

People are drawn to public service because they are interested and engaged in the community. Section 601.A.1 does not prohibit City Officials from having any interest in City business, only a financial or pecuniary interest. That is to say, the Official, personally, cannot stand to gain or lose money or another thing of value from the item of City business at issue.

This provision reflects a similar provision in the Oklahoma Constitution (Art. X § 11), which makes it a felony for any City officer to receive, directly or indirectly, "any interest, profit, or perquisites, arising from the use or loan of public funds" under the officer's control. The Oklahoma Attorney General has concluded that this means any "personal interest of a financial or pecuniary nature." OK AG Opinion 85-138. "Neither the quantity nor the quality of the officer's interest in a business enterprise is material to the application of the prohibition in this section." OKAG Opinion 80-298.

Notably, if such a conflict of interest exists, "it cannot be avoided if the city official recuses himself or herself from any vote concerning payments of city funds to the private entity." OK AG Opinion 01-32. The Constitutional prohibition provides that a violation "shall be punished as may be provided by law, a part of which punishment shall be disqualification to hold office."

Even if a City Official does not completely control the public funds at issue, the Official might exercise sufficient control to trigger this prohibition if the Official has a vote in appropriating the funds or can execute a contract to encumber or expend the funds. If a City Official is an approver in the chain of approvals necessary to expend the funds, such approval would likely constitute sufficient control.

The Oklahoma Attorney General has said that the analogous constitutional prohibition may not be overridden by a hyper-technical interpretation of the Officer's duties. For example, even though a board member may not directly administer or raise the funds at issue, if the board member exercises considerable control by virtue of oversight responsibilities and, for example, the hiring and firing of an executive director, then the board member is at least indirectly responsible for the funds at issue. OK AG Opinion 04-40.

Typically, payment of City funds in furtherance of a public purpose to a non-profit organization employing a City Official would not result in a prohibited financial benefit to the City Official, unless, for example, the City funds are earmarked to pay the City Official's salary.

"(E)ven if the city official's compensation is not paid out of any funds received by the private entity from the city, the city official could have an interest in the city funds if the private entity could not survive without the city funds or if the city funds have a relationship to the funds that are used for the city official's compensation (i.e., matching funds for grants, etc.). Whether a city official has an interest that arises from the use of city funds is a question of fact " OK AG Opinion 01-323.

Section 601.A. is a strict prohibition on receipt of public funds, either directly or indirectly, reflecting the prohibition in Article X Section 11 of Oklahoma's Constitution. This strict prohibition only applies if the if the City Official exercises control by appropriating, encumbering, or expending the funds.

Section 601.B requires disclosure of Financial or Organizational Interests, including those of Immediate Family members, and recusal, but would not necessarily preclude the transaction entirely. This provision ( as it relates to Financial Interests) reflects the requirements of Article XII Section 13 of the City's Charter. This provision applies whether or not the City Official exercises control by appropriating, encumbering, or expending City funds.

These provisions could overlap, so City Officials should consider the facts of each situation and apply the most stringent applicable provision.

An example of an arguable conflict of interest that might be "otherwise permitted under applicable law" would be a City Official's service on a board of trustees for a trust or authority that has the City as a beneficiary. State law contemplates a dual role and provides an exception to the general prohibition against dual office holding for...

"... Any person holding a county or municipal office or position, or membership on any public trust authority, who is a member of a board or commission that relates to.....state,

county or municipal government and is created by.....the State of Oklahoma or a political subdivision of the state, except where the duties of the offices or positions conflict....."

51 O.S. 6.A.5. See also Halstead v. McHendry, 566 P.2d 134, 138 (1977) ("service by public officials as both the representatives of the beneficiary governmental entity and trustees of the public trust, does not, in law, constitute a conflict of interest...."). While there would not be a general conflict of interest, there might be particular conflicts of interest from time-to-time, which might necessitate disclosure and recusal.

When an organization makes a donation to the City, it does not necessarily raise the same concerns of self-dealing as when the organization is receiving public funds from the City. So, even if a City Official has a Financial or Organizational Interest (e.g. is a director or a member of a governing board of the donor agency), the donation would not constitute a conflict of interest, unless the donor agency is demanding something substantial from the City in return. For example, if the donor agency makes its donation contingent on the City spending public funds or refraining from enforcement action for the benefit of the donor agency, the donation could still constitute a conflict of interest for the Official. Otherwise, it would not, pursuant to§ 601.B.

Whether a particular situation would constitute a conflict of interest depends on specific facts and circumstances, and so cannot be answered definitively in response to a broadly defined hypothetical situation.

Does the City Councilor exercise control over the funds and would the deposit result in the City Councilor receiving money? The answer to the first question is likely 'no.' City Councilors do not generally exercise any control over the deposit and investment of the City's pooled cash, and they do not appoint or supervise the City Officials who do, such as the Treasurer. So, regardless of whether the deposits would result in personal benefit to the City Councilor, this scenario would not likely constitute a violation of the § 60 I.A.

While the transaction might be permissible under the Code, the City Councilor would likely have to disclose the interest under § 604.B. There should not be any Council action on the deposit, from which to recuse.

Does the Treasurer exercise control over the funds and would the deposit result in the Treasurer receiving money? The answer to the first question is likely 'yes.' The Treasurer is charged with supervising the investment of City funds. Even if funds are deposited with institutions selected through a competitive bid process, the Treasurer presumably exercises a degree of discretion and control in selecting the institution and managing the investment relationship.

Regarding the second question, while the Treasurer might not receive public money directly, the Code prohibits receiving public funds either directly or indirectly. If the City Treasurer could be seen as steering City deposits to his or her spouse's employer, financially benefiting the spouse and therefore the Treasurer's household, it would likely be a violation of the Code and potentially state law as well.

Depending on the nature of the rezoning request, the outcome of the zoning decision might have a direct impact on the City Councilor's own property use or value. If so, the outcome would be a benefit or detriment to the Councilor's Financial Interest, and so the Councilor would have to disclose the interest and recuse from any participation.

This scenario would presumably not result in a benefit to the Financial Interest of the City Councilor or the Councilor's Immediate Family, so disclosure and recusal would not be strictly required by the Ethics Code. Again, however, it is important to note that the Ethics Code establishes minimum standards of ethical conduct. It does not address every scenario in which an Official might be biased or pre-disposed. City Officials should consider whether their participation in an item of City business has the potential to erode public confidence in official decision-making, regardless of whether the Ethics Code strictly forbids participation.

As a general rule, no. City Officials may have access to City facilities, such as community centers and event spaces, that the general public does not have, but their access is entrusted to them by the public for public purposes. Private use of a public facility would not normally be considered a "minor or incidental uses common to an ordinary workplace," and so would be prohibited by § 601.A.2.

A City Official can reserve a space and pay the generally applicable rental rate, on the same terms as the general public.

As a general rule, no. The gift would exceed $50 and the Mayor has operational and administrative responsibility for City facilities, so the gift could be reasonably perceived as influencing the Mayor in the performance of his or her duties.

The answer might be different if the Mayor is conducting official business at the event, such as presenting a key to the City or engaging in other ceremonial duties of the office. Again, whether a particular situation would constitute a conflict of interest depends on specific facts and circumstances, and so cannot be answered definitively in response to a broadly defined hypothetical situation.

The gift would exceed $50, but the Auditor does not have direct operational and administrative responsibility for City facilities. The Auditor does, however, examine and audit the financial records, accounts, and inventories of City properties, potentially including event venues. The key consideration should always be the preservation of the public's trust in the objectivity of official decision-making.

Whether the value of the ticket and reception is over $50 is a question of fact. Regardless, there is a question as to whether the invitation would "influence or be reasonably perceived as influencing a City Official in the performance of the Official's duties." The Chamber of Commerce typically has contracts with the City and receives City funds, appropriated by the City Council, and so typically is engaged in "pending or reasonably foreseeable matters of City business." That's not the end of the analysis, however. The fundamental question is whether the invitation is truly a "gift" or whether it is a request for Councilors to serve in their official capacities as representatives of the City government. Often, City Officials are asked to serve as community ambassadors, to promote economic and community development at networking events. These kinds of events might reasonably be considered obligations and demands of the job of a City Official, rather than a "gift" per se. This, too, is a question of fact.

The Code's prohibition on receiving gifts does not apply when the gift "will not influence or be reasonably perceived as influencing a City Official in the performance of the Official's duties, such as when there are no pending or reasonably foreseeable matters of City business involving the party offering the gift, the City Official has no control or influence over the item of City business involving the party offering the gift, or the gift offered has a value less than $50, individually, or less than $250, collectively with other gifts from the same or related parties, in a calendar year."

In the scenario described, the Water & Sewer manager does not manage accounting software contracts for the Finance Department, and so arguably has no control or influence over the item of City business. A networking dinner also might not reach the threshold value of $50.

Moreover, in 2022, the Ethics Advisory Committee reviewed a department policy addressing such a scenario and agreed that meals provided to all conference attendees, rather than only to some, would not normally be perceived as attempting to influence a particular City official in the performance of official duties.

Beyond the Ethics Code, however, the City's personnel policies (at Section 224) currently say that receipt of anything over a $35 value (which this might or might not be) from anyone doing business with the City requires "express prior written approval of the Mayor or designee." This demonstrates the importance of considering all applicable rules and regulations, not just the Ethics Code, when considering the ethical implications of official conduct.

The Ethics Code prohibits City Officials from disclosing information that is not an open record or otherwise available to the public and acquired by reason of the Official's position with the City, to any party not entitled to receive such information. The Official also may not use such information to benefit the Official's Financial or Organizational Interest.

If a document is an open record, as defined in the Oklahoma Open Meeting Act, and not otherwise exempt from the Act's requirements, then releasing the record would not be a violation of the Ethics Code. Nevertheless, a City Official must be mindful of other processes and policies governing the release of records. For example, employees are bound to follow Open Records policies and procedures and might be required to submit records for legal review and redaction of confidential personal information. While violating Personnel Policies and Procedures would not necessarily violate the Ethics Code, such actions might subject the employee to discipline. Other examples of confidentiality requirements not implicating the Ethics Code might include HIPAA regulations and attorney-client privileged communications.

A complaint under the Ethics Code must be filed in writing with the City Clerk. Complaints must include the name and address of the complainant, unless the requirements for filing an anonymous complaint are met.

Remember, the Ethics Code addresses situations in which a City Official's impartiality might be called into question or where self-dealing might be alleged. It does not address other matters, such as allegations of workplace harassment or discrimination. There are other rules and procedures for submitting complaints addressing those matters, such as the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures.

Who investigates an Ethics Code complaint depends on the subject of the complaint. For most City employees (except for Council and Auditor staff), investigations are conducted by designees of the Mayor, which might be the Human Resources Department, the City Attorney's office, the Auditor, or the Tulsa Police Department, depending on the nature of the complaint.

To avoid situations in which elected officials investigate their own actions, the Code designates other "Investigating Authorities" for complaints against elected officials. For purposes of Ethics Code complaints, the City Council is the Investigating Authority for the City Auditor, and the City Auditor is the Investigating Authority for the Mayor and individual City Councilors.

Investigating Authorities will conduct a prompt and confidential investigation and issue a report of findings of fact to the Appointing Authority, which is the office or entity with authority to appoint the Official to a position or office, regulate official conduct, and/or impose discipline or sanctions for violations of this chapter.

An intentional violation could subject a City Official to "sanction, disciplinary action up to and including dismissal, or removal from office, as may be provided by applicable policies, rules, or law."

For a City employee, that might mean a written reprimand, suspension, demotion, or termination, depending on the circumstance. See City of Tulsa Personnel Policies and Procedures Section 419, Conflicts of Interest.

For a member of a board or commission, an Ethics Code violation is grounds for disqualification and removal from the member's appointed position for cause under Title 5 TRO § 901.C.5.

The City Council cannot remove an individual City Councilor or the Mayor or Auditor from office for a violation of the Ethics Code. They can, however, censure the official. By a two-thirds vote, the Council may punish its members by a fine of up to $100 for a violation that also constitutes a violation of Council Rules.

An egregious violation of the Ethics Code might subject an elected official to a charge of official misconduct, defined in state statutes as any "willful failure or neglect to diligently and faithfully perform any duty enjoined upon such officer by the laws of this state." Official misconduct can be a basis for removal from office under the procedures defined in state law.

An egregious violation of the Ethics Code (e.g. kickback, embezzlement) might also be a violation of criminal laws, with punishments found in other ordinances and statutes.

If a City Official is not certain whether a conflict of interest exists, he or she may contact his or her manager, supervisor or appropriate Appointing Authority. An Official may ask for advice from the Director of Human Resources and/or the City Attorney. Any elected official; charter division or department head; or member of a City board, commission, or committee, may request an advisory opinion from the Ethics Advisory Committee.

Yes. As noted, Art. X § 11 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that it is a felony for an officer of a city to receive "any interest, profit, or perquisites, arising from the use or loan of public funds in his hands, or moneys to be raised through his agency for ... city ... purposes." See also 21 Okla. Stat. § 341 (Embezzlement).

Title 11 Okla. Stat. § 8-113 provides that no municipal officer (elected official, clerk, or treasurer) or employee - or any business in which the officer, employee, or spouse of the officer or employee has a proprietary interest (25% or controlling interest, unless in blind trust) - shall sell, buy, or lease real property; enter into a contract; or buy bonds from the municipality. These prohibitions shall not apply where two or more bids are submitted pursuant to an open and competitive bid process. But see Art. X Okla. Const. § 11 (which includes no exceptions).

Title 62 Okla. Stat. § 371provides that a City Council shall not make any contract with any of its members, directly or indirectly. (The Tulsa City Council does not make contracts.) This does not include depositing funds in a financial institution, entering into a contract with a nonprofit (unless paying salaries or expenses), or paying monthly utility bills. But see Art. X Okla. Const. § 11 (which includes no exceptions).

Tulsa's Charter, Art. XII § 13, provides that, if a City Official has a direct or indirect financial interest in City business, the Official shall disclose and shall not vote or participate in the matter. Violation "shall render vacant the position held by the person in violation hereof." But see Art. X Okla. Const. § 11 (which includes no exceptions).